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EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: THE 
REHNQUIST COURT REVISITS GREEN AND SWANN 
Brian K. Landsberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Last year I published a study of the twenty-nine race discrimination 
cases decided in the first five years of William H. Rehnquist's tenure as 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.1 I concluded that the 
Court had reached a crossroads in its approach to racial discrimination, in 
which one road could lead to the dismantling of the Burger Court's legacy 
and the other could lead to the selective narrowing of that legacy.1 I also 
observed that the Court's momentum seemed to undermine the pillars of 
the Burger Court's jurisprudence, including two principles embedded in 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,3 the requirement 
of overcoming effects of past discrimination and the tailoring principle. 
During its most recent term, the Court decided two school desegrega-
tion cases which provide some evidence that a wholesale counterrevolution 
against the Burger Court's race discrimination doctrines will be the road 
not taken. Rather, a more cautious approach is emerging. I would now 
like to describe how we arrived at this moment in the development of 
school desegregation law and to examine the themes emerging from the 
first six years under Chief Justice Rehnquist's leadership of the Supreme 
Court. Perhaps this review and analysis can provide some tools for ap-
proaching future school desegregation issues. 
Crystal ball gazing is always risky business, and never more so than 
when the subject is the future of legal doctrine. Nonetheless, the school 
desegregation crystal ball contains two clear pictures. First, we cannot ex-
• Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. Professor Colleen P. 
Murphy provided helpful criticism of this Article at the Thrower Symposium. Rob Vasquez played a 
very helpful role as my research assistant. 
' Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1267 (1992) [here-
inafter Race and the Rehnquist Court]. The present Article draws on that prior article and an earlier 
one, Brian K. Landsberg, The Desegregated School System and the Retrogression Plan, 48 LA. L. 
REv. 789 (1988) [hereinafter Retrogression Plan], but it also discusses new cases and presents revised 
analysis. 
• Race and the Rehnquist Court, supra note I , at 1334-35. 
• 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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pect dramatic expansion of constitutionally protected rights to equal edu-
cational opportunity. Second, reversion to pre-Brown• doctrine is incon-
ceivable. A third picture exists, however. A now clouded crystal ball 
reveals not one answer but two possibilities under the case law of the past 
six years. Without rejecting Brown, the Court could reject the subsequent 
legacy of the Warren and Burger Courts as articulated in Green v. 
County School Board 11 and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education.' The kernels of rejection can be found in some recent opin-
ions. More likely, the Court may retain that legacy while cabining it 
within certain limits described below. 
Debate about the future role of the courts in protecting equal educa-
tional opportunity often lacks grounding in mutual understanding of 
equal protection of the laws. Much debate about busing,' for example, 
fails to distinguish between the legal bases for busing orders and the pub-
lic policies which motivate individuals to support or oppose busing. The 
Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment speaks only to invidious discrimination; thus, busing orders 
may be entered only to remedy invidious discrimination.' Parents, civil 
rights groups, politicians, educators, and neighborhood associations may 
bring or defend against school desegregation suits for a variety of reasons. 
They may wish to integrate or to separate; to improve or to preserve 
school quality; to equalize or to maintain social status; to preserve or to 
change the composition of neighborhoods; or to get elected. The legal is-
sues primarily address equality of process. The social, educational, and 
political issues largely address distributive concerns-that is, how to divide 
the educational pie among various racial groups. These concerns are every 
bit as important as the legal concerns; indeed, they are arguably more 
• Brown v. Board of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . 
• 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
• 402 U.S. I (1971). 
7 
"Busing" is an epithet coined by former Alabama Governor George C. Wallace as part of his 
campaign against desegregation. Black children had applied to attend two rural white schools in Ma-
con County, Alabama and Judge Frank Johnson had ordered the school board to provide them with 
transportation, just as the state board of education had ordered that transportation be provided to 
white students. Governor Wallace charged that Judge Johnson was busing the students. JACK BAss, 
TAMING THE STORM 217 ( 1993). The term now refers to race-conscious student assignment plans 
designed to overcome racial imbalance in school systems. It is employed indiscriminately without re-
gard to whether the imbalance stems from unlawful state segregative actions. 
1 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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important.9 My study of equal opportunity in the courts, however, is lim-
ited to the law, and I leave to educators and legislators the pressing policy 
issues relating to equality and the schools. 
The gap between the legal basis for busing and the aspirations of par-
ties affected by school desegregation decrees renders it difficult to achieve a 
common ground for assessing the validity, the success, or the failure of a 
busing decree. The courts have ignored the policy concerns too often, and 
the policy debate has ignored the reasoning which led the Supreme Court 
to approve busing as a remedy for the officially maintained racially dual 
school system. This has led to the myth of busing as a failed remedy .10 
Busing can succeed in purging state-sponsored racial discrimination from 
a school system, even if it does not improve education or preserve the 
system's majority white enrollment. A successful busing plan achieves "a 
system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."11 
II. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW UNDER THE WARREN AND 
BuRGER CouRTS, 1954-1985 
Brown v. Board of Education held that racial segregation in the public 
schools deprived the black plaintiffs and others similarly situated of the 
equal protection of the laws.12 The Court's reasoning was not as clear as 
its holding. In Brown, the Court seemed intent to respond to Plessy v. 
Ferguson(8 which had rejected the argument that racial segregation 
"stamp[ed) the colored race with a badge of inferiority."14 Therefore, the 
Brown Court turned to psychology, noting that enforced racial segregation 
"generates a feeling of inferiority [in blacks] as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
• Professor Frances Lee Ansley suggests that "civil rights scholars who try to assimilate and 
accept formal equality unmodified will founder upon it. To accept or ignore class division and its 
ideological justifications at this juncture is to forfeit power to deal with race in a meaningful way." 
Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 7 4 
CoRNELL L . REv. 993, 1057 (1989). Her insight in no way detracts from the importance of seeking 
to understand the doctrinal bases of the formal equality decisions. 
10 See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 579 (3d ed. 1992). Professor 
Orfield has convincingly debunked this myth. Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegre-
gation: Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759 (1993). 
11 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). 
lJ 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
lJ 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
14 /d. at SSt. 
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be undone."111 Taking a more familiar approach to review of governmen-
tal actions in the companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe/6 the Court ex-
plained that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to 
any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children 
of the District of Columbia ... an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in 
violation of the Due Process Clause."17 The two articulations may, per-
haps, be harmonized by explaining that it is the stigmatic injury which 
destroys any logical relationship with a legitimate governmental objective, 
such as racial peace or better education. All that remains is the illegiti-
mate governmental objective of elevating one race above another.18 
Two theories supporting Brown rely on subjective factors. State-
imposed segregation might be unconstitutional because it imparts stig-
matic feelings to black children; or the vice might be invidious motives of 
the state actors. Both of these theories treat the black child as a victim. A 
third theory relies simply on the objective fact of different treatment of the 
races; all children are victims under this theory. After Brown, there has 
been little occasion for the Court to refine its reasoning. It mattered little 
at the time whether Brown rested primarily on stigmatic injury, invidious 
intent, or the irrationality of race distinctions; each basis would support 
11 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 . 
•• 347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
11 Id. at 500. Compare id. with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("All 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect .... 
[C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."). 
The difference between Korematsu and Brown was that the segregated schools in Brown curtailed 
the civil rights of both whites and blacks, rather than "a single racial group." Blacks could not attend 
white schools; whites could not attend black schools. The Court subsequently held, however, that "the 
fact of equal application docs not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification 
which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to 
race." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). Indeed, as long ago as 1870, the Court in Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U .S. 303 (1870), held that the Equal Protection Clause declares "that the law .. . 
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand 
equal before the laws .... " Id. at 307. 
•• See joHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 153, 157 (1980) (referring to "first de-
gree prejudice"-"official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake"). Professor Andrew Kull 
argues that Brown was intentionally "historically and legally jejune" for political reasons and that 
Bolling "affords some idea of how the decision in Brown might have been explained had the Chief 
Justice not felt obliged to deeide the Fourteenth Amendment issue in ostensible harmony with Plessy." 
ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CoNSTITUTION 152, 274 n.16 (1992). justice Stevens relied on 
a combination of stigmatic harm and irrationality in dissenting from the Court's approval of a federal 
IO"lo set-aside program for minority contractors. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the Court's holding. The lack of clarity as to which was the ratio 
decidendi, however, created the conditions in which later confusion would 
flourish. 
Brown II 19 added more ambiguity by virtue of its mandate that the 
school systems be ordered "to admit to public schools on a racially nondis-
criminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases."10 
The case might be read to support the view which Justice Scalia attrib-
utes to "an observer unfamiliar with the history surrounding this issue," 
but most likely describes the view of Justice Scalia himself: that free 
choice of schools is all that the Constitution requires.~.n The obstacles to 
implementation described by the Court, however, related to the systemic 
nature of school segregation and could hardly have justified delay if all 
Brown required was the admission of a few black students to white 
schools. Brown II's most important positive contribution was its reliance 
on equitable doctrine as an adjunct to constitutional law. Although its 
conclusion that equity justified delay may have been deeply flawed, the 
decision laid the foundation for the later insight that equitable relief 
would have to address the systemic violation with a systemic remedy. 
Between 1955 and 1968, the Court was repeatedly called upon to ad-
dress foot-dragging and even defiance by school authorities, but as long as 
the primary issue was whether and when Brown would be implemented, 
the content of Brown's nondiscrimination principle was scarcely ad-
dressed.22 In 1968, the Court began defining the school authorities' obliga-
tions in Green v. County School Board," in which the Court disapproved 
a formerly de jure segregated school system's freedom of choice plan that 
had left the schools substantially segregated. The Court held that the suf-
ficiency of a school desegregation plan is to be measured by its effective-
ness. The school system must overcome the effects of its past discrimina-
tion. School segregation is a systemic practice, deeply rooted in what the 
" Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
•• Id. at 301. 
" Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1452 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
" Justice Scalia has noted isolated phrases which might be read to validate free choice as all that 
Brown required. See id. at 1452 n.1 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) and Goss v. Board of 
Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1 963)). Note that neither case involved free choice and neither of the phrases 
quoted by Justice Scalia purports to decide anything about free choice . 
.. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
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Court termed a " dual system, part 'white' and part 'Negro.' "2" Building 
on Brown !Fs reference to the "transition to a racially nondiscriminatory 
school system,''25 the Court reasoned that "[t)he transition to a unitary, 
nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end .... "28 
During the 1 970s, the Court refined Green in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,'·7 Davis v. Board of School Commis-
sioners,28 and other cases. As I have shown elsewhere,29 these cases estab-
lish a set of dichotomies regarding the appropriate school desegregation 
remedy. First, the tailoring doctrine requires that systemic violations be 
systemically remedied but allows more limited violations to receive more 
limited temedies. Second, while unexplained racial isolation in formerly 
dual school systems must be eliminated, racial balance is not required.30 
Third, while all practicable means must be employed to eliminate the un-
explained racial isolation, no more need be done than the practicalities 
allow. Fourth, the courts may not intervene where the school systems are 
in compliance, but must intervene in case of default by the school 
authorities. 
Green and Swann reflected the Court's growing impatience with the 
snail's pace of school desegregation. Not only did the Court begin to em-
phasize the need for results; it insisted that the results be immediate, not 
at some indefinite future time. The desegregation process must have some 
end, and neither deliberate speed nor freedom of choice promised any clo-
sure of this chapter. Thus, the Court rejected freedom of choice in favor of 
more effective tools; it abandoned all deliberate speed and required imme-
.. Id. at 435 . 
•• 349 u.s. 294, 301 (1955). 
11 Green, 391 U.S. at 435-36. For a criticism of this reasoning, see KULL, supra note 18, at 179-
81, 194·95. Professor Kull identifies Judge Wisdom's opinion in United States v. jefferson County 
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), as laying the foundation for Green and argues that "[tjhe 
opinion in Jefferson County identifies not only the moment at which the color-blind ideal was jet-
tisoned by its former proponents but also the theory by which this abandonment of principle was 
rationalized." KULL, supra note 18, at 181. 
•• 402 u.s. 1 (1971 ) . 
•• 402 u.s. 33 (1971 ). 
•• Retrogression Plan, supra note I, a t 802-07. 
•• The Court combined these two doctrines in reversing interdistrict busing relief in the Detroit 
school desegregation case. The district court found it impossible to desegregate the city schools without 
involving the surrounding school systems. The Supreme Court, however, held that racial balance was 
not required and "absent an interdistrict violation, there is no basis for an interdistrict remedy 
.. .. " Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974). 
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diate desegregation. Built into the case law of change, however, was the 
notion of closure. The last dichotomy of the cases required continuing ju-
dicial supervision of the desegregation process, but contemplated that once 
a school system became unitary, further judicial intervention would not 
ordinarily be necessary. It is that notion, of course, that is coming to frui-
tion in the 1990s, with Board of Education v. Dowell and Freeman v. 
Pitts,31 which are discussed below. 
A fateful moment came in Keyes v. School District No. 1,32 where the 
Court rejected Justice Powell's effort to impose on multi-ethnic school sys-
tems a continuing obligation to seek desegregation.33 Justice Powell's ap-
proach would have required a dynamic, rather than a static effort to solve 
racial imbalance problems. Keyes also underscored dicta in Swann that 
racial imbalance caused by discrimination outside the schools need not be 
remedied by the schools. School systems need only remedy the effects of 
their own intentional discrimination.34 The net result of the case law of 
this period was to create two classes of racially imbalanced school systems: 
those with a duty to remedy the imbalance and those with no such duty. 
School systems in the duty class could escape to the non-duty class by 
discharging their duty and avoiding further intentional segregative action. 
Brown wrought a revolution in constitutional law. As one of its critics 
observed, the decision enabled the Court "to move from its historic role as 
•• See BELL, supra note 10, at 592-93; Note, Public School Desegregation-Withdrawal of ju-
dicial Control, 106 HARV. L. REv. 249, 256 (1992) ("The Court's onetime frustration at the slow 
pace of desegregation has given way to frustration at continued efforts to desegregate.") . 
.. 413 u.s. 189 (1973). 
11 Justice Powell wrote that "where segregated public schools exist within a school district to a 
substantial degree, there is a prima facie case that the [school authorities] ... are sufficiently responsi-
ble to warrant imposing upon them a nationally applicable burden to demonstrate they nevertheless 
are operating a genuinely integrated school system." /d . at 225 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote 
omitted); see also id. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring). Although Justice Powell coupled this substan-
tive rule with an attack on mandatory cross-town transportation and a defense of neighborhood 
schools, the Court could have embraced the substantive rule without also adopting these features of his 
opinion. 
•• Professor Kevin Brown has argued that "[e]stablishing invidious intent is tantamount to prov-
ing that the meaning attached to the separation of blacks and whites in schools was a belief in the 
inferiority of African-Americans." Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De 
jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease1, 78 CoRNELL L. REv. I, 14 (1992). That is one possible 
interpretation; more likely, the intent requirement is necessary to determine whether the state is clas-
sifying based on race or on some racially neutral basis. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). 
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a brake on social change to a very different role as the primary engine of 
such change."8~ The generative power of Brown, however, in the realm of 
equal educational opportunity, has been limited primarily to its ban on 
racial segregation. Even there, the refusal in Keyes to extend the ban to de 
facto segregation and the refusal in Milliken to extend it to interdistrict 
racial imbalance further confined Brown's reach. 
III. THE RECENT SuPREME CouRT CAsES REGARDING 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
The Supreme Court has decided four school desegregation cases since 
William H. Rehnquist became Chief Justice. While these decisions for-
mally embrace the Green-Swann line of cases, the question is whether 
they undermine the reasoning of those cases. I will briefly describe them 
before undertaking a broader analysis of themes from recent Supreme 
Court caselaw and their possible significance for the future. 
In Missouri v. jenkins,86 the Court unanimously reversed a district 
court order imposing a property tax increase on Kansas City property 
owners to help fund a school desegregation remedy. Justice White, for the 
Court, concluded that " the tax increase contravened the principles of com-
ity that must govern the exercise of the District Court's equitable discre-
tion in this area. "37 Justice White said that the "proper respect for the 
integrity and function of local government institutions" and the availabil-
ity of a less intrusive remedy precluded direct imposition of a tax in-
crease.38 The district court, however, could order the school board to levy 
such taxes as were needed to fund the remedy, and state laws imposing 
tax limits could not "hinder the process by preventing a local government 
from implementing that remedy."311 Justice White declined to review the 
validity of the underlying remedy because the Court had denied certiorari 
on that question. 
Justice Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He 
took strong issue with the Court's conclusion that the district court could 
10 Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared, CoMMENTARY, Feb. 1986, at 19 . 
•• 495 u.s. 33 (1990). 
11 Id. at 50. 
10 ld. at 51. 
•• Id . at 57-58 (citing North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U .S. 43 (1971)). 
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do indirectly what it could not do directly. Justice Kennedy argued that 
prudence required rejection of the taxation order which the majority ap-
parently approved. 40 He perceived a taxation order as inconsistent with 
the judicial function. He supported this conclusion by arguing that the 
underlying remedial order, even if constitutionally permissible, was not 
constitutionally required; other possible remedies might cost less and thus 
not necessitate increased taxation. Where several possible remedies exist, 
the district court is obliged to choose the one which is least intrusive on 
local governance. Justice Kennedy believed that the denial of certiorari on 
the validity of the desegregation remedy did not foreclose the Court from 
considering this argument. Both the majority and concurring opinions in 
Jenkins remain true to the heart of Swann, which requires school authori-
ties to adopt systemic remedies for systemic violations. 41 
In 1991, the Court decided Board of Education v. Dowell by a S-3 
margin.41 The Oklahoma City schools were desegregated pursuant to a 
federal court order in 1972 and operated under the desegregation plan 
until 1985, when the schools reverted to a neighborhood school system of 
student assignment. The new system caused eleven integrated schools to 
become virtually all black. The plaintiffs' challenge to the new plan ulti-
mately led to a court of appeals decision that the school board had failed 
to justify abandoning the prior court order. The court of appeals applied 
the standard of an old antitrust case, United States v. Swift & Co. ,48 
which held that an antitrust decree should not be dissolved unless it re-
sults in "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforseen conditions .... "•• 
The Supreme Court unanimously disapproved the court of appeals' stan-
dard for dissolving a school desegregation decree, citing prior school deseg-
regation cases which held that desegregation decrees were temporary mea-
sures. Again, the Court considered judicial respect for local governance of 
school systems an important value. The majority, echoing the amicus brief 
•• /d. at 78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not discuss North Carolina State 
~oard of Education v. Swann. 
" In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), the Court had observed that "discriminatory 
student assignment policies can themselves manifest and breed other inequalities built into a dual 
system founded on racial discrimination." /d. at 283. Therefore, the lower court properly applied the 
tailoring doctrine when it ordered the defendants to fund remedial and compensatory education pro-
grams to help remedy those inequalities. 
•• 498 U.S. 237 (1991). Justice Souter took no part in the case . 
•• 286 u.s. 106 (1932) . 
.. /d. at 119. 
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of the United States, failed to give clear guidance as to the standard to be 
applied on remand. The Court took the unusual step of reversing the deci-
sion of the court of appeals, but remanding the case directly to the district 
court, ordering it to "address itself to whether the Board had complied in 
good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether 
the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent prac-
ticable.""11 If so, the injunction should be dissolved and the new student 
assignment plan judged by "appropriate equal protection principles. ""6 
The Court did hint that to the extent that present residential segregation 
is a vestige of former school segregation, continuation of the desegregation 
plan might be required. "7 
The Court did not address the issue of whether the location and capac-
ity of schools might be considered an effect of past discrimination. Nor did 
it address the dissent's argument that the stigma which attaches to one-
race schools is a cognizable effect of past discrimination. "6 The dissent 
would have affirmed, stating that racially identifiable schools are vestiges 
of past discrimination which perpetuate "the message of racial inferiority 
inherent in the policy of state-sponsored segregation."49 The Court's ap-
proach in Dowell was a new tack, reflecting recognition that after more 
than a decade of desegregation it becomes difficult to identify concrete ef-
fects of past discrimination. Justice Marshall maintained that the Court 
should assume that racial stigma attached to one-race schools is a continu-
ing effect of the prior segregated system. 
Freeman v. Pitts 110 involved a narrow issue: whether a district court 
may relinquish remedial control of unitary aspects of a school system 
while other aspects remain to be brought into full compliance. Formally, 
the case did not address the extent of the school authorities' obligations to 
desegregate. All the Justices agreed that the Eleventh Circuit had erred in 
•• Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50. Compare id. with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
14, Dowell (arguing that the Court should ask "(1) whether the district has continuously complied 
with the desegregation decree in good fai th; (2) whether the school district has abandoned any and all 
acts of intentional discrimination; and (3) whether the school district has eliminated, as far as practi-
cable, the 'vestiges' of prior discriminatory conduct"). 
•• 498 U.S. at 250. 
" /d . at 250 n.2. 
•• !d. at 257-58 (Marshall , J., dissenting) (noting that "(r]emedying and avoiding the recurrence 
of this stigmatizing injury have been guiding objectives" of the Court's desegregation jurisprudence). 
•• !d. at 268. 
•• 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). 
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adopting an absolute rule requiring retention of "full remedial authority" 
until the school system achieved "unitary status in six categories at the 
same time for several years."61 However, the Justices voiced a variety of 
views as to what should happen on remand when the lower courts once 
again confronted the question of whether to relinquish supervision over 
the student assignment aspect of the case. Justice Kennedy's opinion for 
the majority reiterated fidelity to Green and Swann. In his view, the 
school system need not permanently ensure racial balance in student as-
signments in order to remedy '1c:j.emographic changes in DeKalb County 
[which] are unrelated to the prior violation,"112 but might be required to 
do so "to correct other fundamental inequities that were themselves caused 
by the constitutional violation. "63 The opinion also implied that relin-
quishment of jurisdiction would depend ~n part on the school authorities 
showing "good faith commitment to the entirety of a desegregation plan so 
that parents, students and the public have assurance against further inju-
ries or stigma."6 ' 
Although Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion, he would have re-
considered the continuing legitimacy and usefulness of the Green-Swann 
doctrine. Justice Souter's concurrence emphasized continuity with that 
doctrine and argued that several possible causal relatipnships which might 
explain future changes in student assignment patterns would require con-
tinuing judicial supervision. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens 
and O'Connor, concurred in the judgment, but would have required the 
court of appeals to employ principles similar to those suggested by Justice 
Souter in reviewing the district court's finding that the school authorities 
had shown that the racial imbalance was not the result of past segregative 
action. Justice Thomas did not participate in Freeman , but his opinion in 
United States v. Fordice 66 suggests that he, for different reasons, might 
also look skeptically at any policy that "remains in force, without ade-
quate justification and despite taiqted roots and segregative effect .... " 68 
The failure of the Court, in both Dowell and Freeman , to provide clear 
definition to the notion of vestiges of past discrimination could stem from 
"' /d. at 1436. 
11 /d. at 1448. 
•• /d. at 1449 . 
•• /d. 
•• 11 2 S. Ct. 2727 (1 992). 
•• ld. at 2745 (Thomas, J., concurring). Set infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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the procedural posture of the cases or from the uncertainty or inability of 
the Justices to agree. 
United States v. Fordice is one of the few recent cases to consider issues 
of initial remedy.67 Although Fordice involves higher education, it pro-
vides many clues as to the Court's current approach to remedial issues. 
The lower courts had held that by removing explicit racial barriers to 
admission to public colleges and universities, Mississippi had complied 
with the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded, holding that "[t)o the extent that the State has not met its affirm-
ative obligation to dismantle its prior dual system, it shall be adjudged in 
violation of the Constitution .... "68 The state had argued that Green's 
rejection of free choice student assignment systems where they fail to bring 
about desegregation should not be transported to higher education. Justice 
Scalia, in partial dissent, agreed; indeed, implicit in his opinion was the 
view that Green itself had been wrongly decided. 611 The Court, while 
agreeing that there were obvious and important differences between ele-
mentary and secondary school systems and systems of public higher edu-
cation,60 applied to Mississippi's public colleges and universities a stan-
dard which flows from the reasoning of Green. It held that " [i]f policies 
traceable to the de jure system are still in force and have discriminatory 
effects, those policies too must be reformed to the extent practicable and 
consistent with sound educational policies. "61 
"' 1 12 S. Ct. 2727 (1 992). 
10 !d. at 2743. 
•• Justice Scalia characterized the Green standard as "amorphous," as placing on the State an 
"ordinarily unsustainable burden," and as encouraging school systems "to assure racial proportional-
ity in the schools." !d. at 2748 (Scalia, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.). 
10 First, the very decision to go to college is voluntary. Second, there is no tradition of mandatory 
state assignment of students to particular colleges. Third, institutions of higher education are not 
fungible. !d. at 2736. 
11 !d. The concurring Justices disagreed as to what this standard meant. Justice O'Connor em-
phasized that the burden remained on Mississippi and that "the circumstances in which a State may 
maintain a policy or practice traceable to de jure segregation that has segregative effects are narrow." 
!d. at 2743 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Thomas seemed to support the majority 
formulation only because he believed the burden o£ justification would impose "a far narrower, more 
manageable task than that imposed under Green." !d. at 2745 (Thomas, J., concurring). He believed 
the Court's standard to be implicitly consistent with an intent requirement: "(I]f a policy remains in 
force, without adequate justification and despite tainted roots and segregative effect, it appears 
dear-clear enough to presume conclusively-that the State has failed to disprove discriminatory in-
tent." !d. Finally, Justice Thomas believed that the state could legitimately maintain "historically 
black colleges as such." !d. at 2746. Justice Scalia, pointing to this disagreement as evidence of con£u-
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The caselaw from Brown to Fordice leaves us with uncertainty as to 
which of several models of desegregation law should govern in the future: 
present invidious intent, stigma, vestiges of past invidious intent, or some 
combination of all three. Certainly proof of present invidious intent will 
be a sufficient showing, but will it be a necessary condition of relief? 
Would proof of stigma in de facto segregated schools show a denial of 
equal protection? Would proof that de jure segregated schools did not im-
part stigma show that there is no denial of equal protection? Will the 
Court continue to require elimination of the vestiges of past discrimination 
or will it establish some time limit on the remedial obligation of school 
authorities? 
IV. THEMES FROM THE RECENT SuPREME CouRT CASELA w 
A. Rules Versus Standards 
Professor Kathleen Sullivan places the "fault line" of the Rehnquist 
Court at the point of separation of rules from standards.82 The education 
decisions of the Rehnquist Court can be viewed as reflecting that fault 
line. On the "rules" side of the line are two camps: (1) those Justices 
espousing narrowing rules of federal and judicial restraint and absolute 
race neutrality and (2) those Justices who would find an overriding duty 
to combat racial stigma. On the "standards" side are those Justices who 
take a pragmatic, balancing approach. Proponents of rules believe they 
can locate definite and binding norms in the Constitution. The proponents 
of standards are much more cautious, basing their decisions on normative 
arguments grounded in custom and precedent. They move slowly and in-
crementally. They are deferential to the legislature. 
Professor Sanford Levinson has pointed out that the division as to rules 
versus standards leads to varying degrees of deference to lower court fact-
finding.83 Application of standards may be much more fact-dependent 
than application of rules. In the 1960s, the Fifth Circuit, fed up with the 
footdragging of local school boards and district courts, fashioned detailed 
sion engendered by the Court's opinion, concluded that "essentially, the Coun has adopted Grem." 
ld. at 2753 (Scalia, J. , concurring in pan and dissenting in pan). 
•• Kathleen M. Sullivan, Fortword: The justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 
22, 26 (1992). 
•• Sanford Levinson, Remarks at the American Association of Law Schools Mini-Workshop on 
The New Supreme Court Uan. 6, 1993). 
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rules to govern every school desegregation case.64 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court itself based its ruling in Swann on "the need for remedial criteria 
of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority's compliance with its 
constitutional duty .... "&& In the 1990s, some lower courts have fashioned 
rules which tend to lead mechanically to the approval of retrogression 
plans. 88 Changes in the federal bench could render the degree of deference 
more significant than at present, when both the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts are filled with Reagan-Bush appointees. The personnel of 
one level could become dominated with Clinton appointees while the other 
could remain dominated by Reagan-Bush appointees. Adherence to the 
rule of Pullman-Standard v. Swint 67 would leave many equal opportu-
nity cases in the hands of the district courts, while treating issues in these 
cases as questions of law would place the Supreme Court as their primary 
arbiter. 
The Jenkins case declines to adopt the absolute rule, proposed by the 
State of Missouri , of noninterference with local tax schemes.68 Instead, the 
opinions of Justices White and Kennedy adopt a standard which requires 
assessment of need and alternatives.69 Dowell can be read as rejecting a 
per se rule ascribing talismanic power to a finding of unitariness; it 
clearly rejects a virtually per se rule against lifting or modifying injunc-
.. See, e.g. , United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), 
modified, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Singleton v. Jackson 
Mun. Sch. Dist. , 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965). 
•• Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 26 (1971). 
•• See, e.g. , Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986) . 
., 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (holding that discrimination is a factual determination which an appel-
late court may reverse only if the finding is clearly erroneous). Thus, the Court upheld a finding of 
discrimination as not clearly erroneous in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), and upheld a finding 
of no discrimination as not clearly erroneous in Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991). 
" Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
•• True, Jenkins does purport to narrow somewhat the district court's discretion, limiting that 
court to the remedy which least restricts local autonomy. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 
(1990), required a court to use the "least possible power adequate to the end proposed" to enforce a 
structural injunction designed to overcome past housing discrimination by the City of Yonkers. Id. at 
280 (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966)). The Court appears to have 
narrowed district court discretion in cases such as jenkins and Spallone, in which the exercise of 
broad discretion disadvantaged the governmental defendant, while broadening district court discretion 
in cases such as Freeman, where the defendant benefits from the broadened discretion. The rule of 
Freeman, however, could work to the advantage of either party, depending on how the district court 
exercises its discretion. 
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tions. Freeman70 and Fordice, too, adopt a standard calling for careful 
assessment of vestiges of past discrimination. The resort to standards in 
Dowell, Freeman, and Fordice elicits objections from Justice Scalia, who 
complains that "( w ]e have never sought to describe how one identifies a 
condition as the effluent of a violation, or how a 'vestige' or a ' remnant' of 
past discrimination is to be recognized."71 At the other end of the spec-
trum, Justice Marshall, too, would prefer a concrete rule. He argues that 
racial identifiability of schools that could be desegregated is a per se ves-
tige of past discrimination and therefore must be eliminated. 72 
B. Stigma 
The Court assumed in Plessy v. Ferguson that if "the enforced separa-
tion of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority 
. . . it is . . . solely because the colored race chooses to put that con-
struction upon it. "73 Brown's rejection of that position relied in part on 
facts showing that stigmatic injury arises from state-enforced segregation. 
Brown seemed to follow Plessy in focusing on the feelings of the victim 
rather than on the motives of the perpetrator of segregation. The Court 
quickly turned to a less fact-dependent theory in subsequent cases, how-
ever, stressing the suspect nature of racial classifications. 7• That suspect 
70 See Note, supra note 31, at 259 (suggesting that Freeman is " part of a recent trend . .. of 
increased deference to district courts"). 
71 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1451 ( 1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). That criticism was 
valid prior to Freeman. See Retrogression Plan, supra note 1, at 819 (suggesting, however, that one 
could infer "that three types of lingering effects are especially relevant: (a) racial identifiability of 
schools; (b) effects of school placement and capacity; and (c) effects of school segregation on housing 
patterns"). In fact, the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy in Freeman provides examples of legally 
significant vestiges of past discrimination. See 112 S. Ct. at 1448. Justice Scalia levies the same criti-
cism in Fordice: "[T]he Court is essentially applying to universities the amorphous standard adopted 
for primary and secondary schools in Green .... "United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2748 
(1992). 
71 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 251-52 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
71 163 u.s. 537, 551 (1896). 
,. References to stigma appear in occasional opinions, but generally not as central points. Justice 
Douglas' dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), did rely in part on the argument that 
a "segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated 
classroom." /d . at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Swann justified majority-to-minority transfers as 
"lessen[ing] the impact on [transferring students] of the state-imposed stigma of segregation." Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 26 (1971). In another opinion, the Court noted 
that secession of a white city from a desegregating school system would cause "the same adverse 
psychological effect" as the segregation in Brown. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 466 
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nature flows from the general irrationality of race as a proxy for merit. 
Two opinions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 711 did 
wage a mini-debate on the importance of stigma. The opinion of Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun argued that the affirmative ac-
tion program at issue in Bakke should be upheld because it pursued a 
sufficiently important state interest and did not operate to stigmatize any 
group. Justice Powell's opinion, announcing the judgment of the Court, 
rejected reliance on "the pliable notion of 'stigma,' " a word with "no 
clearly defined constitutional meaning." He objected that stigma "reflects 
a subjective judgment that is standardless."76 
Of late, some Justices have increasingly reverted to references to stigma 
in race discrimination cases; the term has become a double-edged sword.77 
Thus, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a race-based set-aside program 
because "[ c )lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic 
harm."78 On the other hand, Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dowell, 
would have required continued race-based busing because he believed that 
"[o]ur pointed focus in Brown I upon the stigmatic injury caused by seg-
regated schools explains our unflagging insistence that formerly de jure 
(1972). In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court rejected standing of parents of black 
children attending desegregating school systems to assert what the Court characterized as "abstract 
stigmatic injury" stemming from alleged deficiencies in the Internal Revenue Service's regulations 
denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. /d . at 7 55. 
71 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
•• ld. at 294 n.34. 
11 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: Reclwning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rt:v. 317 (1987), may have provoked renewed interest in what he calls 
"the stigma theory." Professor Lawrence argues that "stigmatizing actions injure by virtue of the 
meaning society gives them," id. at 352, and that "stigma occurs whether there is racial animus or 
not." ld. at 353. If stigmatizing actions result from unconscious racism, they should be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. If the "cultural meaning" of the actions "conveys a symbolic message to which the 
culture attaches racial significance," the Court "would apply heightened scrutiny." /d. at 356. Based 
on BaltJce and City of Memphis v. Greene, Professor Lawrence characterized Justices Brennan and 
Marshall as the Court's chief proponents of the theory which "cites racial stigma as the primary 
target of suspect classification doctrine." /d . at 345 & n.114; see also Charles R. Lawrence III, Segre-
gation "Misunderstood": The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. Rt:v. 15 (1977). 
11 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). In concurrence, Justice 
Stevens said that "the stereotypical thinking that prompts legislation of this kind .. . stigmatizes the 
disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination . . . [and] actually imposes 
a greater stigma on the supposed beneficiaries." /d . at 516-17; see also Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 596 n.49 (1990); id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 631 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
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segregated school districts extinguish all vestiges of school segregation."79 
His opinion continues with repeated references to stigma, which he identi-
fies as one of the vestiges of segregation which must be extinguished. 
Thus, he concludes, the concept of vestige "extends to any condition that 
is likely to convey the message of inferiority implicit in a policy of segre-
gation"80 and the "racial identifiability of a district's schools is such a 
condition."81 This language was partially adopted by the Court in Free-
man, which explained that vestiges of the dual system must be eliminated 
"in order to insure that the principal wrong of the de jure system, the 
injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored by the violation, is 
no longer present."82 The Court, however, did not agree that racial iden-
tifiability of schools alone caused stigmatic injury. Finally, in Fordice, 
Justice Scalia maintained that to insist that all-black schools "not be per-
mitted to endure perpetuates the very stigma of black inferiority that 
Brown I sought to destroy."83 
The double-edged nature of stigma is forcefully revealed by comparing 
Justice Marshall's Dowell approach with Justice Scalia's Fordice opinion. 
Note that although stigma is a fact-based concept, neither opinion refers 
to any facts in the record regarding stigma. Plessy resolved the factual 
dispute in favor of separate but equal, based not on facts but on assump-
tions by the Justices. Brown resolved the dispute against separate but 
equal based on lower court findings of fact and on the writings of social 
scientists. Justices Marshall and Scalia reach opposing results based on 
conflicting assumptions about the stigma which comes from either tolerat-
ing or repudiating one-race schools. While seemingly recognizing some 
role for stigma, a majority of the Court appears to be uncertain as to the 
10 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 257 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
•• Id. at 260-61. 
01 ld. at 268. 
11 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992); see also id. at 1449 (The school district must 
show good faith , to provide "assurance against funher injuries or stigma .... "). 
•• United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2752 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in pan and 
dissenting in part); see also id. at 2743 (O'Connor, J ., concurring) (referring to "stigmatic harms 
caused by discriminatory educational systems"). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
(1992), however, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, argued in dissent that "(t]he rule 
of Brown is not tied to popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a judgment that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not permit racial segregation, no matter whether the public might come to 
believe that it is beneficial." Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This aniculation seems to 
downgrade the significance of stigma in Brown. 
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boundaries of that role. 
A recent attempt to refashion the stigma rationale into a coherent the-
ory provides a sophisticated critique which could help explain how reli-
ance on stigma could lead Justices Marshall and Scalia to opposite results. 
Professor Kevin Brown argues that the Court believes, on the one hand, 
that "the harm of de jure segregation is inculcating the notion of black 
inferiority to public school children. Yet, on the other hand, the reason 
that remedies are necessary is because segregation actually retarded the 
development of African-Americans, thus making them inferior to Cauca-
sians."84 Justice Marshall finds the racial insult in the maintenance of 
one-race schools; Justice Scalia finds it in the assumption that one-race 
schools are unacceptable. Professor Brown suggests a different approach, 
which views the harm of racial discrimination in education "as distorting 
the value inculcating process of public schools."81! He believes that the 
Court's approach in Brown v. Board of Education viewed segregated 
schools as making African-American children inferior, so that the reme-
dial task was to remedy the inferiority of those children. While his argu-
ment is provocative, it fails to account for other, more plausible, explana-
tions of the Court's reasoning: that the reliance on stigma is necessary to 
rebut Plessy and to eliminate possible state justifications of segregation; 
that the Court views stigma as resting on prejudice, not reality;86 and that 
the school desegregation cases rest primarily on the general presumption 
against racial classifications, which in turn can be traced both to the origi-
nal purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and to American notions of 
merit and equal opportunity. Those explanations recognize that racial 
segregation in education harms both white and black children, though the 
•• Brown, supra note 34, at 6; see also Louis Michael Seidman, Brown & Miranda, 80 CAL. L. 
REv. 673, 712-13 (1992) ("Symbolically, the assertion that black facilities were inherently unequal, 
that they could not be made equal regardless of the resources devoted to them, and that it did not 
matter how well students performed in them, implied that the mere nonexposure to whites deprived 
blacks of their rights." ). Professor Seidman cites Malcolm X and Derrick Bell as making similar 
points. /d. at 712-13 nn. 124-25. 
•• Brown, supra note 34, at 50. 
11 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U .S. 429 (1984), where the Court overturned a state court decision 
divesting a white mother of custody of her child because she had married a black man. The state court 
had been concerned that the child wou.ld "suffer from the socia.l stigmatization that is sure to come." 
/d. at 431 (quoting Petition for Cert. app. at 26-27). The Court ruled, however, that "the law cannot, 
directly or indirectly, give [private prejudices] effect." /d. at 433. 
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latter have generally been the target of segregation laws.87 They recognize 
the continuing existence of racial prejudice, without in any way implying 
that one race is inferior. 
C. Stare Decisis 
A number of recent decisions have grappled with the role of stare deci-
sis in constitutional cases. Unlike statutory cases, where Congress may 
legislatively correct judicial error, the political branches must attempt to 
amend the Constitution if they wish to correct an erroneous Supreme 
Court interpretation of the Constitution. Accordingly, some Justices es-
pouse an activist role of reaching out to overrule constitutional error88 
while others take a more cautious approach, attempting to define circum-
stances when the Court should correct constitutional error.89 The opinion 
of the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 90 reveals an approach to 
stare decisis which may bear on the future vitality of Green and Swann, 
as well as Brown itself. The Court mentioned several factors bearing on 
the deference to be accorded prior decisions construing the Constitution: 
workability, judicial competence, reliance, evolution of legal principles, 
and changed factual hypotheses. The Court applied these factors in decid-
ing not to overrule the essential, central holding of Roe v. Wade.91 Some 
of these same factors, however, formed the basis for the opinions of the 
three Justices abandoning Roe's trimester framework. 92 It thus appears 
that the stare decisis factors may dictate adherence to core principles while 
allowing reconsideration of "framework" issues. I will return to this ques-
tion below, in asking whether either Brown or Green and Swann are in 
danger. 
"' Set also BELL, supra note 10, at 585 ("We can guarantee that black and white children 
receive the same education by educating them together."). 
00 Set, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
" E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2618 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). 
00 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
II 4)0 U.S. JJ3 (1973). 
•• Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter). 
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D. The Substructure of Antidiscrimination Law 
As I noted in Race and the Rehnquist Court, antidiscrimination law 
has come to rest on assumptions regarding behavior and race and on re-
medial principles regarding effects of past discrimination and insurance 
against future discrimination.98 Erosion of these assumptions and princi-
ples would undermine this structure. 
I. Race Neutrality and Assumptions Regarding Behavior and Race 
How do we explain uncomfortable phenomena: that some schools are 
predominantly white, while others are virtually all African-American? Or 
that predominantly white schools often receive more local resources than 
African-American schools? Or the disparate output of the two sets of 
schools? Undoubtedly a variety of explanations might be offered, ranging 
from intentional discrimination by school authorities to chance. Between 
these two poles lie such factors as economic status, past discrimination by 
society reaching back to the days of slavery, cultural differences among 
groups, and voluntary choices as to place of residence. If plaintiffs prove 
disparity, should we assume the disparity arises from chance or from in-
tentional discrimination, or from other factors? The Court holds that only 
intentional discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause.94 Swann 
and Keyes established that, to prove intentional discrimination, plaintiffs 
must show more than racial imbalance in the schools; once intentional 
discrimination has been found, however, the school authorities have the 
burden of proving that racial imbalance was not the product of that 
discrimination. 
Some recent decisions outside the school desegregation arena have re-
flected disagreement among the Justices as to the conclusions to be drawn 
from proof of racial disparities. Their views are internally inconsistent: 
The Brennan wing assumes that, all else being equal, persons of one 
race will be just as qualified as persons of another race; yet, the 
same Justices assume that race brings unique qualifications to the 
electronic media. The Rehnquist wing assumes that formal equal 
opportunity has led (or can lead) to a society in which the race of 
.. Race and the Rehnquist Court, supra note I, at 1300-09 . 
.. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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others does not affect our treatment of them, but may well affect 
their own conduct. 96 
841 
The recent school desegregation decisions reflect this tension. Green and 
Swann created a presumption that one-race schools were the result of the 
prior dual school system. Unless a school system could show that the ra-
cial imbalance stemmed from factors beyond the control of the school au-
thorities, it would have to correct the imbalance. Justice Scalia's opinions 
in Freeman and Fordice suggest an abandonment of that burden. Justice 
Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Freeman formally retains the burden 
while adding the wild card of proximate cause to the formulation. 98 Both 
Justices believe that the likely explanation for the new racial imbalance in 
the schools lies in the freely-made choices of residence rather than in dis-
criminatory practices that have long since been remedied. Other Justices, 
however, are not ready to abandon the presumption against one-race 
schools in formerly dual school systems.97 
Closely allied with these conflicting assumptions regarding race are 
conflicting views regarding racial neutrality. Busing is a race-based rem-
edy. One view, the benign use approach, holds that at times, "to get be-
yond racism, we must first take account of race."98 Another view-the 
colorblind approach-holds that race-conscious remedies are almost never 
appropriate.99 Both views lead to instrumental approaches to legal norms. 
Supporters of benign use tend to accept norms which benefit minorities. 
Proponents of absolute racial neutrality are suspicious of norms which 
•• Race and the Rehnquist Court , supra note 1, at 1302. 
"Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1447 (1992) ("The school district bears the burden of 
showing that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.") 
(emphasis added). 
01 Justioe Souter seemingly placed on school authorities the burden to show that "there is no 
immediate threat of unremedied Green-type factors causing population or student enrollment changes 
that in turn may imbalanoe student composition." /d. at 1455 (Souter, J., concurring). Justioe Black-
mun would require the district court to retain jurisdiction "until the school board demonstrates full 
compliance." /d . at 1456 (Blackmun, J. , dissenting). 
00 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
" For example, Justioe Scalia has stated: 
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with 
the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which is the ten-
dency-fatal to a nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and women on the basis 
of ... the color of their skin. 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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permit, require, or encourage breaches of neutrality.100 Justice Thomas' 
opinion in Fordice may suggest yet a third approach. He argues that a 
state may operate colleges "with established traditions and programs that 
might disproportionately appeal to one race or another."101 Thus, he as-
sumes that cultural differences between the races might lead members of 
each race to prefer differing traditions and programs. Moreover, Justice 
Thomas would hold that maintenance of such traditions and programs 
with full knowledge of their racial impact does not constitute invidious 
race discrimination . His logic would lead to a distinction between racial 
identification of institutions, which results from benign reasons and is 
therefore permissible, and racial identification, which results from invidi-
ous reasons and is therefore impermissible. Justice Thomas' formulation 
could bridge the gap between the benign use approach and the racial neu-
trality approach. 
2. Effects of Past Discrimination 
Does the basic principle that the perpetrators of unlawful discrimina-
tion must not only stop discriminating but must take affirmative steps to 
eliminate the effects of that discrimination remain vital? The disagree-
ment between the benign use and racial neutrality theories is one cause of 
the mixed signals emanating from the Court on this question. On the one 
hand, it has subordinated that principle to values of racial neutrality and 
local governance. 102 Several Justices have expressed concern over any 
standard which "effectively assures that race will always be relevant in 
American life .... " 103 On the other hand, both Freeman and Fordice, as 
well as United States v. Paradise/0" insist that the reparative principle is 
of overriding importance. Dowell left unanswered the question whether a 
formerly dual school system that has become unitary is free to adopt a 
retrogression plan without scrutiny of possible reinstitution of effects of 
100 See Race and the Rehnquist Court , supra note I , at 1310-17. 
101 United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2746 (1992) (Thomas, J. , concurring). 
••• See Race and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 1, at 1307. }en/tins and Dowell are among 
the cases stressing deference to local control. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991 ); 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
101 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (majority opinion of Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy). 
10
' 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding a federal court order to use racial criteria to overcome past 
history of race discrimination in employment practices). 
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past discrimination. If the Court were ultimately to answer affirmatively, 
Green and Swann would lose their logical moorings. Those cases depend 
on a duty to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. If a school system 
is free to reinstitute those effects, the initial duty to eliminate such effects 
would appear to be worse than futile, when one considers the disruption 
flowing from instituting and then rescinding a busing plan. Ironically, the 
path to destruction of this reparative doctrine would begin with reviving 
stigma as the evil addressed by Brown. If students do not experience 
stigma by attending a de facto one-race school, then the fact that twenty 
years ago the school had been de jure segregated would hardly seem to 
affect the perception of this generation of elementary school students. The 
effect of the past discrimination is not stigma, but segregation. 
V. APPLICATION TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IssuES 
A. Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools 
1. Voluntary Desegregation 
A dictum in Swann upheld the right of school authorities to take volun-
tary race-conscious steps to desegregate the public schools. One purpose of 
voluntary busing could be to avoid litigation claiming de jure segregation. 
Other purposes might include a desire, for educational reasons, to provide 
ethnic diversity in every school or a simple wish to avoid even de facto 
segregation because it is deemed harmful to children of all races. Given 
the modern Court's general antipathy to some forms of race-conscious ac-
tion, 10& one might have wondered whether the Swann dictum was in jeop-
ardy. The Court seems unlikely to bar voluntarily adopted busing plans. 
Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the Court's decision in 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. ] 108 held unconstitutional a 
state anti-busing initiative that prohibited local school systems from adopt-
ing racial busing plans not constitutionally required. Second, the Court 
seems to treat public schools within a school district (or even within a 
state) as fungible; that is, differences among schools normally do not rise 
to a constitutionally significant level. That is the import of San. Antonio 
••• Stt , e.g., City or Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
or Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Regents or the Univ. or Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) . 
... 458 u.s. 457 (1982). 
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Independent School District v. Rodriguez/07 which upholds the Texas 
system of school finance notwithstanding marked disparities among school 
systems. And the Court has said as much in United States v. Fordice, 
when it distinguished elementary and secondary education from higher 
education, partly on the ground that " like public universities throughout 
the country, Mississippi's institutions of higher learning are not fungible 
. .• • "
108 Thus, school assignments do not pose the zero sum problems that 
race-based employment and contracting practices pose. If this is true, 
neither race is disadvantaged by busing. Finally, voluntarily adopted bus-
ing plans are a well-embedded fixture in many school systems today. The 
pragmatism and Burkean traditionalism of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter109 would lead to reluctance to disrupt school systems that have 
made that choice. 
Busing arguably imposes stigmatic mJury on African-American stu-
dents. As Justice Scalia's opinion in Fordice argues, "[T)he insis-
tence . . . that [one-race] institutions not be permitted to endure per-
petuates the very stigma of black inferiority that Brown I sought to 
destroy." 110 The Rehnquist wing has tended to assume "that race-
conscious affirmative action stigmatizes the minority persons whom it is 
designed to help."111 At least the moderate members of that wing, how-
ever, now seem unlikely to challenge a legislative determination by a local 
school board that a busing plan would help, not hurt, minorities. 
2. Proof of Initial Violation 
The justices are firmly united in agreement on the core principle of 
Brown and in repudiating Plessy. But the Brown umbrella is broad 
enough to shelter conflicting views as to when the core principle has been 
breached. 
107 411 u.s. 1 (1973). 
101 112 S. C t. 2727, 2736 (1992). 
100 Stt Sullivan, supra note 62, at 123. In Planned Parenthood, the Court's stare decisis discus-
sion relied in part on two decades of "people . . . [organizing! intimate relationships and [making! 
choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability 
of abortion . . .. " Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 , 2797 (1992). This reliance prong of 
stare decisis would apply to the widespread adoption of voluntary busing plans. 
11° Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
111 Race and the Rehnquist Court, supra note I , at 1323. 
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Some Justices would hold that strong statistical evidence of racial dis-
parity should shift the burden of explanation to the alleged discrimina-
tor.112 The logic of their position would lead to the conclusion that adop-
tion of a student assignment system, having the natural and foreseeable 
consequence of racial imbalance, should shift to the school authorities the 
burden of showing a lack of discriminatory intent. Other Justices assume 
that racial disparities may well stem from factors other than discrimina-
tion by the school authorities. This assumption imposes on plaintiffs the 
difficult burden of proving intentional discrimination by school systems in 
states that did not require segregation at the time Brown was decided. 
The difficulty in meeting this burden has been clear since the time of 
Washington v. Davis 113 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp. w. Plaintiffs have successfully litigated 
few northern school desegregation cases. Those cases have required thor-
ough and expensive development of facts. While the Supreme Court has 
lost none of its commitment to ending intentional racial discrimination, 
the Arlington Heights standards tend to delegate to the district courts dis-
cretion in weighing evidence of discrimination. Moreover, the application 
of the clearly erroneous rule to the finding of whether a defendant dis-
criminated greatly enhances the power of the district courts. 
3. Remedy 
a. Initial Remedy 
Outside the school desegregation arena, the Court has grown increas-
ingly dubious about race-based remedies. Some Justices maintain that the 
Constitution is colorblind and worry that requiring or approving race-
based remedies might, at worst, be constitutionally suspect or, at best, en-
courage voluntary race-based actions inconsistent with a general duty of 
racial neutrality. Those concerns may combine with doubt as to the effi-
cacy of busing to lead the Court to uphold remedies that do not fully 
desegregate the schools. In the past, the Court has not been consistent on 
this point. In Davis v. Board of School Commissioners/15 the Court re-
111 E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 337 (1987) (Brennan, J. , dissenting); id. at 352 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
111 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
114 429 u.s. 252 (1977). 
116 402 u.s. 33 (1971). 
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versed a lower court ruling that failed to bring about the greatest degree 
of desegregation consistent with the practicalities, but the Court declined 
to hear other cases, leaving some one-race schools which arguably could 
have been desegregated.w1 The regime of Green and Swann provides 
great discretion as to how desegregation is to be achieved; in that sense 
those cases establish standards rather than rules.117 Read literally, they 
establish a strict rule requiring one-race schools to be desegregated, how-
ever it is accomplished. The exceptions to that rule-that one-race schools 
need not be desegregated if the school authorities show that they do not 
result from past discrimination or that desegregation is simply impractica-
ble-were in practice normally treated as very narrow. The reliance on 
effectiveness and practicalities in Green and Swann, however, sows seeds 
of self-destruction. Busing has not fared well in the public relations arena, 
despite its effectiveness in dismantling segregation in much of the South. 
If the Court sees it as an ineffective and impractical remedy, the "practi-
calities of the situation" would seem to dictate its abandonment. All these 
factors may, in combination with the growing tendency of the Court to 
prefer standards over rules, erode Green and Swann. 
Another possibility, signaled perhaps by Missouri v. Jenkins/ 18 may be 
a growing preference for remedies short of busing. This could mean the 
use of non-coercive incentives, such as magnet schools. Such remedies are 
already permissible where they operate effectively to substantially reduce 
the racial imbalance in a school system. But how much racial imbalance 
will the Court tolerate in future magnet school plans? In Milliken II, the 
Court approved educational remedies for students in one-race schools 
where full desegregation was not feasible. 119 Will the Court go further 
and allow educational remedies as a substitute for even feasible 
desegregation? 
111 See, e.g. , Carr v. Montgomery County .ISd. of Educ., 511 F.2d 1374 {5th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 986 {1975). 
117 Justice Powell later plaintively characterized Swann as "having laid down a broad rule of 
reason under which desegregation remedies must remain flexible and other values and interests be 
considered." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 238 (1973). 
118 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
110 See Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins: Art We Really a Desegregated Societyr, 61 
FoRDHAM L. REv. 57, 59-60 (1992). 
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b. Plaintiff Requests for Additional Relief 
Swann held, and Freeman confirms, that desegregation orders are to 
remain in effect for some period of time to assure that the objectives of 
those orders-ending discrimination and curing its lingering effects-are 
actually achieved. Thus, one of the Court's reasons for approving with-
drawal of judicial supervision from areas where it was no longer needed 
was to allow the district court to "concentrate both its own resources and 
those of the school district on the areas where the effects of de jure dis-
crimination have not been eliminated and further action is necessary in 
order to provide real and tangible relief to minority students."120 While 
the plaintiffs are not entitled to yearly adjustments to ensure racial bal-
ance, 121 they are entitled to further relief if the plan does not eliminate the 
effects of past discrimination, or where the school authorities fail to com-
ply in good faith. Indeed, Freeman found a duty of the school district to 
display "an affirmative commitment to comply in good faith with the en-
tirety of a desegregation plan . . . . " 122 
c. Third Party Attacks on Relief 
Some fear has been expressed that the recent decision in Martin v. 
Wilks 123 could undermine existing remedial orders of federal district 
courts in discrimination cases.124 Whatever the basis of that fear in fair 
employment cases, attacks by non-parties challenging school desegregation 
relief as impairing the rights of white students have uniformly failed for 
two reasons, which appear to remain valid.125 First, white students have 
no litigable interest in attending a one-race school or in avoiding busing. 
11
° Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1447 (1992). 
111 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
•u 112 S. Ct. at 1450 . 
... 490 u.s. 755 (1989) . 
... Owen Fiss has argued that Martin v. Wilks exposes the structural injunction to attack by 
non-parties and threatens the finality of the injunction. Owen Fiss, Address to American Association 
of Law Schools, Section on Remedies Uan. 9, 1993). But see Joel L. Selig, Affirmative Action in 
Employment After Croson and Martin: The Legacy Remains Intact, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
116 Set, e.g., Bradley v. Pinellas County Sch. Bd., 961 F.2d 1554 (I lth Cir. 1992) (recognizing a 
right to intervene to assert an interest in a desegregated school system). Bradley reviews the prior 
Eleventh Circuit cases, which deny intervention where the challenge to a desegregation plan is based 
on policy rather than constitutional reasons. See also Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 
1982); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970). 
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Second, their generalized interest in not being subjected to an ill-conceived 
desegregation plan will almost always be adequately represented by the 
school authorities. Thus, Martin seems unlikely to pose a threat to deseg-
regation orders.126 
d. Dissolution of Decree 
Green said that "whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in 
practice, and the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-
imposed segregation has been completely removed."127 This implicit sug-
gestion that a court should relinquish jurisdiction at some point is sup-
ported by Swann, which noted: "At some point, these school authorities 
and others like them should have achieved full compliance with this 
Court's decision in Brown I. The systems would then be 'unitary' in the 
sense required by ... Green .... "128 The Court added that 
once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and 
racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the 
system ... [and] in the absence of a showing that either the school 
authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately at-
tempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial com-
position of the schools, further intervention by a district court should 
not be necessary. 12' 
Thus, successful compliance with the busing injunction should lead at 
some point to some form of absolution. Typically, in the lower courts, this 
has taken the form of a declaration of unitariness followed by dissolution 
of the injunction.130 
As I have argued/31 the declaration of unitariness is not a talismanic 
event. 132 The dissolution of the injunction is, however, of greater signifi-
111 But see People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that other panies to a school desegregation suit may not alter a collective bargaining agreement over 
the objections of an intervening teachers union in absence of a finding of intentional racial 
discrimination). 
117 Green v. County Sch. Bd. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
, .. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971). 
••• Id. at 32. 
110 See Retrogression Plan, supra note 1, at 811-13 . 
... /d . 
,.. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443·4 (1992) (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 
u.s. 237, 245 (1991 )). 
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cance, since it may effectively signal the end of the district court's supervi-
sion of the school district. Freeman now provides further guidance as to 
the rules governing dissolution. 
Freeman could signal a gradual shift from the systemic approach of 
Green to the "atomistic" analysis that has marked the Rehnquist wing's 
approach to race discrimination cases.us Green and its urban cousin, 
Swann, recognized that the segregation laws created dual school sys-
tems-one set of schools for whites and one for blacks. All aspects of the 
system worked together in creating and perpetuating segregation and all 
such aspects must be eradicated. Freeman erodes this systematic approach 
while formally adhering to it. On the other hand, Freeman can be viewed 
as a very limited holding, affecting the status of DeKalb County schools in 
the courts, but not affecting their obligation to adhere to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
The DeKalb County School System had endured over twenty years of 
"judicial supervision," a phrase fraught with negative implications. One 
consequence of its historical embrace of segregation had been a presump-
tion that all of its schools, which enrolled students of one race in 1969, 
were de jure segregated and must become desegregated. Although the clos-
ing of black schools was a common desegregative technique in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, DeKalb County's experience is probably atypical. 
It closed all of its black schools and assigned their students to formerly 
white schools. Over time, the black population grew, and several formerly 
white schools became virtually all-black. Tracing the racial imbalance to 
past racial segregation would be difficult, at best. The district court found 
the school system had not caused the racial imbalance, which it character-
ized as "inevitable."1u Thus, the case's holding could be read as very 
narrow, inapplicable to the more common scenario of the retrogression 
plan represented by Riddick and Dowell. This is not a case where the 
Supreme Court assumed that racial segregation simply arose from natu-
ral, non-discriminatory causes. Rather, the Court relied on detailed dis-
'" See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and tht Elusive Meaning of 
Constitutional Equality, 87 MtCH. L. REv. 1729, 1761 (1989). But see Justice Scalia's complaint in 
Fordice that the Court had failed to apply an atomistic analysis: "It appears ... that even if a 
particular practice does not, in isolation, rise to the minimal level of fostering segregation, it can be 
aggregated with other ones, and the composite condemned." United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 
2747-48 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pan) (emphasis in original). 
114 See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1440. 
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trict court findings that blockbusting (which by 1969 was illegal) was one 
cause, and that other, possibly more innocent causes, also contributed.136 
The district court in Freeman found a lack of unitariness with respect 
to assignment of faculty and staff and with respect to quality of education. 
The DeKalb County School System had failed to maintain racial balance 
of faculty and staff as required by Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Sepa-
rate School District. 138 DeKalb's inputs, in terms of per pupil expendi-
tures and teacher qualifications and experience, were lower for predomi-
nantly black schools than for predominantly white schools. The Supreme 
Court had no occasion to review these findings; however, it seems appar-
ent that issues such as these may be the next to be brought to the Court. If 
school systems are not required to maintain racial balance of students once 
desegregation has been achieved, will the Court uphold a requirement 
that they maintain racial balance of faculty and staff? If disparate inputs 
alone fail to show a Fourteenth Amendment violation, will the require-
ment of equal inputs survive? If so, a kind of de facto separate but equal 
doctrine will apply to districts like the DeKalb County School System. m 
The broad holding of Freeman-that a district court has "the authority 
to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental 
stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school 
operations,"138-rejects a rigid rule and embraces standards. The court of 
appeals had held that "a school system achieves unitary status only after it 
has satisfied all six factors at the same time for several years."139 The 
Supreme Court stated, however, that "[t]he term 'unitary' does not confine 
the discretion and authority of the District Court in a way that departs 
from traditional equitable principles."140 
This is a double-edged statement. It favors the school board because the 
116 Here, the Court mentioned racially disparate birth rates, growing job opportunities for blacks 
in DeKalb County, and easier freeway access to Atlanta jobs. ld. 
••• 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), ctrt. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970). 
"' Professor Kevin Brown suggests that the Court should not relinquish jurisdiction so long as 
"the educational quality of schools attended by African-Americans is inferior to that of schools at-
tended by whites," because such disparities inculcate what he labels "the invidious value." Brown, 
supra note 34, at 39. The invidious value is defined as the opposite of the value of racial equality, 
"and public schools cannot attempt to instill [such] a contrary belief." ld. at 20. 
106 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445 (1992). 
118 Jd. at 1442 (quoting Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1446 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
••• /d. at 1444. 
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district court had exercised its discretion to relieve the school system of 
some of the obligations of the prior decree. The opinion implies, however, 
that the district court could have properly exercised its discretion so as to 
maintain all prior obligations. The touchstone of this section of the opin-
ion seems to be equitable discretion. Had the Court ruled for the plain-
tiffs, it would have followed that unitariness, and not discretion, would 
have been the touchstone of the decision. Instead of relying on a fixed 
legal construct such as unitariness, however, the Court instead asks 
whether the "district has demonstrated its commitment to a course of ac-
tion that gives full respect to the equal protection guarantees of the Con-
stitution."141 The Court recognizes that discrimination "may emerge in 
new and subtle forms after the effects of de jure desegregation have been 
eliminated. " 142 
Swann contained language to please both sides, and the same may be 
said of Freeman. Freeman probably would be read with Dowell to allow 
liberal dissolution of decrees without dissolving the underlying duty to en-
sure that racial imbalance in student assignments not be traceable to con-
stitutional violations. The Court, however, has inserted an ambiguous and 
therefore potentially troublesome modifier, referring to imbalance not 
traceable "in a proximate way" to constitutional violations.143 The term 
proximate, of course, calls for the court to make policy choices and allows 
the court to determine that although a logical nexus exists, it is too far 
removed to be considered proximate. As Justice Scalia's concurrence accu-
rately points out, the Court has articulated the rule at a high level of 
generality, without giving detailed guidance to the lower courts. Justice 
Scalia apparently would place the burden of proving proximate relation-
141 Id. at 1445. The district courts are not, however, given untrammeled discretion. See, e.g., Lee 
v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment dis-
solving desegregation decrees where plaintiffs had proferred evidence of violations of the decrees). 
141 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445. Professor Kevin Brown has argued that both Dowell and Free-
man, in emphasizing good faith and assurance that the school system will not return to its former 
discriminatory ways, are focusing on the school system's "attitude towards African-Americans .... In 
other words, the district must prove that it is no longer acting under an assumption that African-
Americans are inferior when it formulates its policies and programs." Brown, supra note 34, at 31. 
This argument stretches those cases considerably. Initial relief in those cases did not depend on proof 
that the school authorities treated African-Americans as inferior; why, then, should dissolution of the 
decree depend on such proof? Of course, if such proof were adduced, it would be pertinent to the 
question of dissolution. The cases, however, simply apply normal equitable principles in holding that 
the threat of recurrence of the original harm precludes dissolution of an injunction. 
141 Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446. 
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ship on the plaintiff, while Justices Souter, Blackmun, O'Connor, and 
Stevens would place the burden of proving lack of proximate relationship 
on the school authorities. As Justice Scalia also correctly observes, the 
party with the burden is most likely to lose because of the difficulty of 
proving what residential patterns would have been like absent the past 
discrimination.144 
4. Post-Dissolution Retrogression Plans 
As long as a school system is subject to court supervision it is clear that 
it may not adopt a retrogression plan-a plan which increases racial isola-
tion in the schools. This is so because such systems retain an affirmative 
duty to promote desegregation, a duty which other school systems are 
spared. What remains unclear is what standards should apply to a for-
merly dual system which has earned release from the court's supervision 
and been declared unitary. Dowell reviewed such a plan but provided lim-
ited guidance because the opinion focused on the court of appeals' error in 
applying the Swift & Co. standard146 rather than on the general issue of 
the retrogression plan. Freeman provides more help. The Court required 
that a school system seeking release from the desegregation decree not 
only have implemented a plan which eradicates the vestiges of past dis-
crimination, but also that the district have "an affirmative commitment to 
comply in good faith with the entirety of a desegregation plan."146 The 
language seems to infer that a school district manifesting an intent to 
adopt a retrogression plan, if freed from court supervision, will not be 
declared unitary. It would not be a far leap to conclude that a district 
adopting such a plan after the declaration of unitariness would thereby 
have committed a new violation. This approach, supported by other lan-
guage in Freeman, constantly emphasizes the obligation to avoid segrega-
tion traceable to the past discrimination.147 
••• See id. at 1452 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Retrogression Plan, supra note I , at 809. 
141 Su supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
••• Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1450. The Coun also listed as a factor for the district coun to 
consider "whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students 
of the once disfavored race, its good faith commitment to the whole of the coun's decree ... . " /d. at 
1446. 
141 The Tenth Circuit, speaking of the related question of a plaintiff's request for further relief, 
said that under Freeman , "what matters is whether current racial identifiability is a vestige of a 
school system's de jure past, or only a product of demographic changes outside the school district's 
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If a formerly segregated school system desegregated for a period of 
years may adopt a retrogression plan without scrutiny of possible reinsti-
tution of effects of past discrimination, then Swann itself will have lost its 
underpinnings.1" 8 On the other hand, Justice Marshall's stigma approach 
would lead to a virtually permanent ban on one-race schools. Preserving 
the tailoring and reparative doctrines should be possible without unduly 
impairing the ability of local school systems to structure student assign-
ments and without imposing some permanent racial balance formula. The 
Court could achieve this result by allowing school systems, declared uni-
tary, to freely adopt new assignment systems, subject to challenge that the 
system either acted with discriminatory intent or reinstated effects of past 
discrimination. 1" 9 The case will then be like an initial violation case, with 
one important exception. Not only would proof of present discriminatory 
intent establish a violation, but so would a link with the disciminatory 
intent of the past dual system. The question would become who should 
bear the burden of proof. 1110 
Of course, the initial burden belongs to the plaintiff challenging school 
board action. Thus, the plaintiff should have the burden, at a minimum, 
of showing that the district has adopted a retrogression plan. At this point 
the burden should shift to the school district to show that, as Freeman 
puts it, the "racial imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to 
constitutional violations. " 11n That burden would be difficult to sustain 
where the retrogression plan returns particular schools or neighborhoods 
to their pre-desegregation condition. As Justice Thomas noted in his con-
curring opinion in Fordice, "if a policy remains in force, without ade-
control." Brown v. Board of Educ., 978 F.2d 585, 591 (lOth Cir. 1992). The court added that the 
good faith that would justify a federal court's relinquishment of jurisdiction does not exist where a 
strong "possibility of immediate resegregation following a declaration of unitariness" exists. /d. at 
592. Finally, even after a court relinquishes control over student assignments, a court with retained 
jurisdiction over other facets should disapprove the re-emergence of student segregation where "linked 
to a vestige of the past system." /d. at 593. 
"" I provide support for this conclusion in Retrogression Plan, supra note 1, at 832. 
"" Set id. 
110 Another possible question is whether the claim could be raised in the dismissed case or in a 
new action. Logically, it could not be raised in the dismissed case, because dismissal ended that case's 
very existence. Set Lee v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir. 1992), ctrt. 
denied , 113 S. Ct. 1257 (1993); see also Dowell v. Board of Educ., 782 F. Supp. 574, 579 (W.D. 
Okla. 1992) ("For any [post-dissolution! developments that Plaintiffs believe are discriminatory, they 
must bring a new action alleging a new constitutional violation .... "). 
111 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992). 
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quate justification and despite tainted roots and segregative effect, it ap-
pears clear-clear enough to presume conclusively-that the State has 
failed to disprove discriminatory intent."162 Dowell suggests that practica-
bility might provide a justification.163 In other cases, the school system 
may seek to rely on a preference for neighborhood schools or magnet 
schools, justifying the retrogression. Freeman does not provide guidance as 
to whether such a showing would suffice.164 It does suggest that remote-
ness in time might be a factor but it is not clear why that should be the 
case where the plaintiffs have proved retrogression. Adoption of a retro-
gression plan need not be motivated by present discriminatory intent in 
order to offend the Fourteenth Amendment. If the plan reinstitutes the 
vestiges of the dual system, it is based on past discriminatory intent and 
the rule which should apply is the same as in the case of an initial viola-
tion: "[A]fter past intentional actions resulting in segregation have been 
established . . .. the burden becomes the school authorities' to show that 
the current segregation is in no way the result of those past segregative 
actions. " 166 
This approach is arguably unfair to school systems because it effectively 
makes it impossible for a school system in the duty class to join the non-
duty class. Thus, formerly de jure segregated school systems which had 
successfully completed the transition to non-discriminatory unitary status 
161 United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice 
Thomas' point is slightly different than mine; he is looking for present discriminatory intent while my 
suggested test looks to practices which reinstate the effects of past discriminatory intent. 
103 Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991). 
104 Educational preference would not be enough to justify racially imbalanced neighborhood or 
magnet schools in a school district attempting to fulfill its initial duty to effectively desegregate a 
former dual system. 
111 Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 211 n.17 (1973). The Fifth Circuit, in a pre-
Freeman case, ruled that plaintiffs challenging a retrogression plan bear the burden of proving that 
the school authorities adopted the plan with discriminatory intent. Price v. Austin lndep. Sch. Dist., 
945 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1991). The court agreed that the holding of a prior school desegregation case 
which had found and remedied a dual system in Austin was binding on the school authorities, but 
disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that they reflected present discriminatory intent. The plain-
tiffs apparently did not argue, and the court did not address, the possible reinstitution of the effects of 
the past discrimination. Judge Wisdom, however, said that "retrogression (which] does not appear to 
have resulted from demographic changes" points "to the necessity for further desegregative efforts." 
!d. at 1322 (Wisdom, J., concurring). The Dowell district court on remand also required proof of 
present discriminatory intent but did not consider whether retrogression linked to vestiges of the prior 
dual system would constitute a fresh deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Dowell v. Board of 
Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144 (W.O. Okla. 1991). 
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would retain a vestigial duty which other school systems would not have 
to bear. Therefore, similarly situated school systems would hold disparate 
legal obligations. This is a flawed argument, grounded on a wrong pre-
mise. In fact, the school systems are not similarly situated. The former 
dual system could reinstate vestiges of dualism by adopting a retrogression 
plan; the system which was never dual could not reinstate vestiges of a 
dualism that never existed. I would argue that the approach I have sug-
gested recognizes both the value of local control and the mandate of avoid-
ing the vestiges of past discrimination. The suggested scheme frees the 
school system from judicial supervision in all but two circumstances: pre-
sent discriminatory intent and reinstatement of vestiges of past discrimina-
tory acts. It lowers the stakes in proceedings to declare the school system 
unitary and dissolve the desegregation decree and therefore is likely to 
result in diminishing the number of school systems under active court 
supervision. 
B. Alternative Systems of Education 
Dissatisfaction with the public schools has led to proposals for radical 
change to our system of elementary and secondary education. While de-
tails of the proposals may differ, their core purportedly relies on the mar-
ketplace, rather than government regulation to ensure educational quality. 
Parents would choose schools and the state would subsidize those choices. 
Choice is sold as a cure for what ails American education, whether it be 
spotty quality, decreasing enrollments, or lessened public support. Various 
systems could accommodate choice. The freedom of choice plans, which 
Green effectively disapproved, were flawed because they offered a choice 
between black schools and white schools; the Court's plea for "just 
schools" suggests that choice among schools not tainted by state discrimi-
nation might be approved. Efforts to provide such a choice include magnet 
school programs, so-called charter schools,1116 and opportunities for attend-
ance in neighboring school systems. One variant proposes providing some 
schools with an "Afrocentric curriculum" which would be intended to 
raise the self-esteem and educational achievement of black students.1117 A 
••• See, e.g., CAL Eouc. Com: § 47605(a)-(g) (West 1992) . 
.., See Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285 (1992). A 
variant on this would exclude white students (and even black females) from proposed all-male acade-
mies. The Constitutional difficulties with such a proposal are outlined in Drew S. Days Ill, Brown 
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more radical type of proposal would extend choice to a "private" school as 
well as a "public" one. The adjectives are enclosed in quotation marks 
because the nature of the program would render differentiating the public 
schools from the private ones more difficult. The state would likely refuse 
subsidies to any schoo_l which discriminates on account of race, but it is 
not clear how the state would identify such schools.1118 Indeed, federal law 
forbids schools, both public and private, from engaging in racial discrimi-
nation against prospective1119 or enrolled160 students. 
If adoption of a subsidy plan leads to increased racial isolation, would 
the plan violate the Equal Protection Clause? This question might be 
asked first with respect to a school system with no history of past unlaw-
ful racial segregation and second as to a formerly dual school system. Let 
us suppose that a large city school system has not discriminated in the 
past. It adopts a choice plan or the state adopts a voucher plan which 
extends to all schools in the state. Through parental choice, some public 
schools become racially isolated; some private schools remain racially iso-
lated. Under present caselaw, the Court would uphold such a plan unless 
challengers showed it was adopted with intent to bring about the segrega-
tion. Moreover, prior school board or legislative knowledge that the sub-
sidy plan would likely increase racial isolation would not, standing alone, 
provide sufficient proof of such intent. Possibly some of the private schools 
formerly had racially restrictive admission policies or were established to 
provide white students with a haven from integrated public schools. Per-
haps the vestiges of past discrimination doctrine would bar subsidizing 
those schools. 
In most school systems, however, such "segregation academies" would 
be rare. Some schools may screen students who apply for admission. For 
example, a college preparatory school may require a high score on a stan-
Bllus: Rethinking the Integrative Model , 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 53, 60-62 (1992). 
, .. One issue associated with such subsidies is the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, since many of the schools which would benefit from the state subsidies would be church-
affiliated. This issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
101 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
'"" See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1991), which legislatively repudiates the rule of Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Patterson would have withheld statutory protection against 
conduct occurring after the formation of the contract While it was an employment case, Patterson's 
logic would have allowed racial discrimination by private schools in which minority students were 
enrolled. See THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 694-95 (3d ed. 1991). 
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dardized achievement test. Minority students may be disproportionately 
rejected from such a school. Another school might stress a bilingual, bi-
cultural curriculum and reject students who speak only English; such a 
school would enroll a disproportionate number of minority students. A 
plan which thus increased racial isolation would threaten equal educa-
tional opportunity, as that phrase is conceived by many. Nevertheless, the 
Court insists on proof of invidious intent and assumes that racially dispa-
rate choices can be explained by factors other than racial discrimination. 
This would lead the Court to reject heightened scrutiny in an equal pro-
tection challenge to such a plan. The question would then be whether the 
standards which lead to rejection of minority students are rational. The 
change from fungible schools to schools that are designedly not fungible 
could lead the courts to apply more bite to that inquiry, since exclusion 
from distinctive schools is a greater deprivation than reassignments be-
tween like schools. 
The analysis in a formerly dual school system may well lead to a more 
searching scrutiny. First, private schools in such a district are more likely 
to have been founded as segregation academies, so that racial disparities in 
them would be a vestige of past discrimination. Second, the subsidy plans 
are in essence freedom of choice plans which, according to Green, may be 
allowed only if they do not lead to racial isolation. Justice Scalia believes 
that freedom of choice removes all forbidden aspects of the dual system, 
but no other Justice has joined him on that point. 
Formerly dual school systems, as we have seen above, can be divided 
into two groups: those declared unitary and released from federal judicial 
review and those still subject to a structural injunction. The former would 
claim that they should be treated identically to school systems with no 
history of discrimination. Dowell does not answer that question. The lat-
ter would have the burden of showing that the subsidy plan is consistent 
with an affirmative duty to promote desegregation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Brown and Swann were compromise opinions, papering over many dif-
ferences of approach. Inevitably, those differences have now resurfaced 
and will have to be worked out as the courts' attention shifts from issues 
of initial remedy in former de jure segregated school systems to issues of 
duration of remedy, duties of systems freed from the remedy, and the le-
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gality of innovations in the educational system. The unanimous and 
wholehearted homage which all Justices pay to the holding of Brown does 
not translate into agreement as to Brown's rationale. The wavering and 
splintered nature of the support for Green and Swann springs from at 
least two sources. First, those who read Brown to command colorblindness 
may find race-conscious remedies in conflict w ith that command. Second, 
those who read Green and Swann as no more than pragmatic responses to 
the period of massive resistance to school desegregation may conclude that 
the doctrine of those cases has served its purpose and may now be rele-
gated to honorable retirement. Those cases stem in part from the Justices' 
reaction to the intransigent failure of the deep South to comply with 
Brown. Not only is official resistance to Brown seen as ended, but most of 
today's Justices joined the Court after Green and Swann.161 If the Court 
instead reads those cases as fulfilling a core constitutional mandate flow-
ing directly from Brown, however, they will survive!62 To the extent that 
Swann is based on the systemic nature of school segregation and on the 
deeply rooted effects of dual school systems, it does fulfill Brown's core 
mandate. To the extent that it flows from the exigencies of the moment, it 
is peripheral to that mandate. 
Brown recognized the constitutional right of the black plaintiffs. Except 
for a few failed attempts to expand the constitutional right to equal educa-
tional opportunity/63 most of the caselaw since Brown has concerned rem-
edies. We may be entering the last phase of the remedial issue. Undoubt-
edly, many school systems will be released from federal court supervision 
in the next few years. It is too soon to predict whether we will see a 
resurgence of efforts to discover new ways of mounting federal constitu-
••• No Justice remains from the Court that decided Green. Justice Blackmun is the sole survivor 
of Swann. See Exodus I :8 ("There arose in Egypt a new pharaoh who knew not Joseph."). 
••• The "all deliberate speed" doctrine of Brown II arguably " disconnected the right violated 
from the remedy." Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 FoRD· 
IIAM L. REv. 23, 27 (1992). If so, Green and Swam• reconnected the right and remedy by artiL-ulating 
the principle that the scope of the violation determines the nature of the remedy. 
••• The Court has, in effect, said that the Constitution does not provide blanket protection for 
equal educational opportunity. The Constitution forbids arbitrary denials of equality, such as those 
based on race, but allows rationally based educational decisions. The Court allows wide latitude for 
legislative determinations as to what is rational. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs. , 487 U.S. 450 
(1988); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. I (1973). But see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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tiona! challenges to denials of equal educational opportunity. 1114 Such ef-
forts will have to face up to the Court's incremental approach to change, 
its reluctance to turn its back on precedent, its distaste for structural rem-
edies, and its general deference to local educational decision-making. They 
might attempt to build on the possible return to balancing, which would 
occur if the Justices of standards prevail over those of rules. What is miss-
ing at the moment is a new and persuasive theoretical framework to ac-
count for all these factors. 
The shift from rules to standards may place more power in the hands 
of federal district judges. It marks a change from the era when the lower 
courts almost automatically imposed busing plans for fear of being over-
ruled on appeal. If all a district court needs to find in order to dissolve the 
desegregation order in a case is good faith compliance and suppression of 
"proximate" vestiges of past discrimination, most school systems will soon 
be eligible for release. Their release will then bring forward the issue not 
resolved by Dowell: will a school district's progress from the duty class to 
the non-duty class leave it with no further obligations with respect to neu-
tralized but not eradicated effects of past discrimination ?1611 As noted 
above, an affirmative answer to that question destroys the foundations of 
Green and Swann.166 A negative answer would require the Court to de-
fine more precisely those effects and the continuing role, if any, of stigma. 
Green and Swann did not explicitly depend on stigma or on notions of 
value inculcation. They addressed physical manifestations of the racially 
dual system, such as students, teachers, transportation, school construc-
tion, and extracurricular activities. The Freeman Court added a poten-
tially significant factor: "the more ineffable category of quality of educa-
tion."167 If the Court returns to reliance on stigma in school cases, it will 
have to choose among several modes of analysis. Should stigma be inferred 
or proved? More particularly, should the Court infer stigma from one-
race schools as Justice Marshall suggests or from the refusal to allow one-
114 Of course, many plaintiffs have abandoned federal claims for potentially more fruitful state 
ones. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1992); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
, .. See Shaw, supra note 119, at 60 (arguing that "(s]chool desegregation remedies have not 
eliminated the vestiges of segregation; at best, they may have neutralized or circumvented the effects of 
segregative actions"). 
, .. Set supra p. 843. 
111 Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1441 (1992). 
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race schools as Justice Scalia suggests? If stigma must be proved, what 
proves it: intent to stigmatize or the victim's feeling of stigmatization? 
Parties to cases involving equal educational opportunity should pay at-
tention to the themes that animate the current Court's rulings. 188 Bald 
efforts to overrule core Warren or Burger Court rulings seem doomed, at 
least in the short run.189 Prayers for structural relief such as busing, in-
terdistrict remedial measures, or extra money for educational programs 
should emphasize the extent to which these have become entrenched in the 
American educational system and the disruptive effects of change in doc-
trine.170 Paul Dimond has persuasively suggested, however, that plaintiffs 
in future litigation might benefit from a restrained approach to remedy.171 
A remedy which is forged in the political process is more likely to succeed, 
and the courts may be more willing to see the facts that constitute a viola-
tion if they are aware that massive structural relief is not the only proper 
remedial response. Mr. Dimond is also correct in suggesting that plaintiffs 
should return to broad and deep proof of racial discrimination, because a 
no-fault approach is supported neither by law nor by the American pub-
lic. Where discrimination is shown, however, remedy is likely to follow. 
What is the future of equal educational opportunity in the courts? As I 
suggested at the outset, the answer depends on what one means by the 
'
08 Another factor to consider is the extent to which the federal government influences judicial 
decision-making regarding equal educational opportunity. Brown followed the approach of the Solici-
tor Genera l. After passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Departments of Justice and Health, 
Education and Welfare (and its successor, the Department of Education) took active roles in formulat-
ing policy. The Solicitor General proposed, in the Government's brief in Green, that desegregation 
plans should be judged by their effectiveness. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
at 3, Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). During the past 12 years, the government has 
gravitated toward less activism in promoting minority rights, while at the same time becoming more 
visible in resisting affirmative action, busing, and judicial supervision of school systems. The Depart-
ment of Justice and Solicitor General under President Clinton can be expected to revise the Depart-
ment's priorities, if not its legal positions. 
••• See Joel L. Selig, Race in America: The Unfinished Business, 28 LAND & WATER L. REv. 
345, 364 (1993) (arguing that recent cases have "not yet undermined the basic structure of school 
desegregation law," but that the retrogression plan presents " the most likely area of danger"). 
110 Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the emerging Court is a Burkean traditionalist Court 
which is antagonistic to demagogic government, social engineering, and anything not honored by time. 
Such a view values stability as an independent good and fears that the unleashing of force.s not tested 
by the past may lead to unanticipated results. Professor Cass Sunstein, Address to American Associa-
tion of Law Schools Mini-Workshop on the Supreme Court Uan. 6, 1993). 
111 Paul R. Dimond, Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education and its Legacy: A Tribute to 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Panel II: Concluding Remarlts, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 63, 66 (1992). 
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question. If equal opportunity means the end of racial isolation and the 
achievement of equal funding or outputs, the Court long ago gave a nega-
tive answer and nothing in current doctrine suggests that it is rethinking 
that answer. If equal opportunity means freedom from present intentional 
racial discrimination in the public schools, its future is secure. If it also 
means freedom from the lingering effects of past discrimination, its future 
hangs in the balance. If it has some other meaning, as yet undefined, pre-
diction must await another day. 
